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This paper attempts to investigate the impact of sectoral wage laws in South Africa.
Specifically, we examine the impact of minimum wage laws promulgated in the Retail,
Domestic work, Forestry, Security, and Taxi sectors using 15 waves of biannual Labour
Force Survey data for the 2000–2007 period. Using a quasi-experimental approach, we
apply two alternative specifications of a difference-in-differences model to estimate the
impact of multiple minimum wage laws in South Africa on employment, wages, and
hours of work. In order to assess whether the changes experienced by workers in the
sectors analysed were unique to those sectors, a unique control group is identified for
each sector. We find some evidence of a significant increase in real hourly wages in the
post-law period in four of the five sectors examined. Our results also suggest that whilst
there was no significant impact of the laws at the extensive margin, there was some
evidence of an adjustment at the intensive margin in certain sectors. We also find that
in three of the five sectors, increases in real hourly wages were sufficient to outweigh
intensive margin adjustments so that workers in these sectors experienced an
improvement in real monthly income as a result of the law.
JEL codes: C21, J23, J30, J31, J38.
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The aim of this paper is to investigate how employers in a low wage sector of the labour
market respond to the introduction of a minimum wage. The standard textbook model of
minimum wages predicts that in a competitive equilibrium, there is a negative relation-
ship between minimum wages and employment. However, a growing number of studies
indicate that the relationship between the minimum wage and employment is not neces-
sarily always negative (Katz and Krueger 1992; Card, 1992a, b).
The international debate on minimum wages began even before minimum wages were
first introduced in the United States at 25 cents per hour in 19381. The relationship be-
tween minimum wages and labour market outcomes is a relatively recent debate in South
Africa by international standards. Whilst the international literature on minimum wages
dates as far back as the theoretical works of economists such as Stigler (1946) and Lester
(1947), leading into the new minimum wage research (Card, 1992; Card and Krueger
1994, 1995; Neumark and Wascher 1992), the literature on minimum wages in South2013 Bhorat et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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South Africa have a fairly short history compared with other comparator countries2.
The introduction of minimum wages in 1999 in the Contract Cleaning sector was
followed by sectoral minima for the Civil Engineering and Private Security sectors in
2001. Since then, a few studies have been conducted in South Africa which explore the
effects of the minimum wage on employment, hours worked and other labour market
outcomes, as well as the impact of minimum wages on household poverty (Hertz
2002a, 2002b, 2005; Bhorat, 2000; Dinkelman and Ranchhod, 2012). These studies tend
to focus on a single sector, such as the Farm or the Domestic worker sectors, which are
of course traditionally low-wage employee sectors. Hertz (2005) concludes that employ-
ment changes experienced by Domestic workers since the introduction of the sectoral
minimum wage were no different to workers in other sectors. A more recent study by
Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012) found that the probability of employment of a typical
Domestic worker was unchanged after the introduction of minimum wage laws. No
empirical attempt has been made this far however, to investigate the impact of mini-
mum wages on the other covered sectors in South Africa. This is perhaps due to the
complex nature of the minimum wage laws in South Africa, with multiple minimum
wages that differ by sector, occupation and often by location of employment that make
it difficult to allocate wages to individual workers in the household survey data.
This paper attempts to address this gap in the literature by providing an analysis of
the impact of these multiple minimum wages on the wages, employment and hours
worked of affected workers in South Africa. In doing so, this study constitutes the first
attempt to investigate the impact of minimum wages in South Africa in sectors other
than the Farm and Domestic worker sectors, and provides a more complete picture of
the labour market impact of the country’s multiple minimum wage laws.
2. Evidence on the impact of minimum wages
Early studies on the effect of the minimum wage on employment, dating as far back as
the work of Stigler (1946), predicted that in a competitive labour market, the relation-
ship between minimum wages and employment is a negative one. A number of studies
on the effects of the minimum wage on teenage employment also confirmed this result
(Brown et al. 1982; Charles et al. 1983), although later evidence suggested that whilst
the employment impact was negative, the effect was small, with a 10 percent increase
in the minimum resulting in a reduction in teenage employment of less than 1 percent.
On the other hand, earlier studies such as Lester (1960, 1967) found no negative
employment effect associated with the legislated minimum.
The 1990s saw the beginning of a new stream of literature on minimum wages, known as
the ‘new minimum wage’ literature. The results from this literature suggest that the text-
book argument of a trade-off between minimum wages and employment does not necessa-
rily hold (Katz and Krueger 1992; Card, 1992a, b; Machin and Manning, 1994). In their
seminal work, Card and Krueger (1994) presented new evidence on the effect of minimum
wages on employment, finding no disemployment effects from the mandated minima.
Neumark and Wascher (2007) in their review of the recent minimum wage literature, con-
clude that whilst a few studies do find positive effects associated with the minimum wage,
the majority of studies suggest a negative impact, particularly when the effects of minimum
wages are analysed in the aggregate as opposed to within a specific sector.
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studies on the effects of minimum wages using non-U.S. data are sparse3. This is par-
ticularly the case for studies on the effects of minimum wages in developing countries.
This is somewhat surprising, given that developing countries provide an interesting
context for the analysis of minimum wage effects due to the often larger exogenous
variation in the minimum wage in these countries (Hamermesh, 1993, 2002).
A recent study by Gindling and Terrell (2005, 2007) investigated the employment
effects of an increase in minimum wages in Costa Rica over the 1988 to 2000 period.
Their results suggest that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage results in a
decline in employment and hours worked in the covered sector of around 1.09 percent
and 0.6 percent respectively. They find that the impact of the minimum wage in Costa
Rica is the largest for unskilled workers, and conclude that those individuals rendered
unemployed in the covered sector enter the uncovered sector. However, their results
do not show any significant impact at the intensive margin in the uncovered sector.
Since the introduction of the first sectoral minimum wage (Contract Cleaners in 19994)
in South Africa, there have been a few studies that have considered the impact of mini-
mum wage laws in the country. However, these studies have mostly focused on the effects
of the law in a specific sector. In particular, the sectoral minima in the Farm and Domestic
worker sectors have received attention in this respect. Bhorat (2000) showed that mini-
mum wage hikes in South Africa are associated with a decline in employment among
low-paid Farm and Domestic workers. Hertz (2005) analysed the impact of minimum
wages on employment and earnings of Domestic workers in South Africa, finding that
whilst minimum wages were associated with a rise in average monthly and total earnings,
there were significant disemployment effects resulting from the laws. In the Agricultural
sector, Conradie (2004) found negative employment effects of between 3 and 6 percent
associated with a 10% rise in the minimum wage for a sample of 190 grape farmers in the
Western Cape. Another case study was conducted by Murray and Van Walbeek (2007) on
a sample of 103 Farm workers in the sugar industry. Their results showed that whilst no
large disemployment effects occurred, there was some indication that employers substi-
tuted at the lower skills margin as well as adjusted at the intensive margin of labour
to reduce weekly wage costs. Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012) used a difference-in-
differences approach to investigate the impact of minimum wages in the Domestic worker
sector. They conditioned their sample on urban Domestic workers employed over the
2001–2004 period, finding no significant changes in employment on the intensive or the
extensive margins for Domestic workers. Bhorat, Kanbur and Stanwix (2011) used a simi-
lar approach to analyse the impact of introducing a minimum wage in the Agricultural
sector for South Africa. Using data for the 2000–2007 period they showed that whilst
there were significant negative effects associated with the minimum on the extensive
margin, the effects on the intensive margin were insignificant. There has however, been
very little research on the impact of minimum wage laws in other sectors in South Africa.3. Data and econometric approach
3.1. The South African labour force survey
The dataset used is a pooled dataset consisting of 15 waves of the South African Labour
Force Survey (LFS) from 2000 to 2007. The LFS is a nationally representative household
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Africa (StatsSA) between 2000 and 2007 during February/March and September. The
survey includes around 30,000 households in both urban and rural areas in South Africa.
Information in the LFS is self-reported. In 2008, the LFS was replaced with the Quarterly
Labour Force Survey (QLFS). However, the QLFS does not provide any information on
wages and the September 2007 LFS remains the last nationally representative survey that
contains wage information. All 15 waves were pooled and are treated as repeated cross-
sections over time.
The South African Department of Labour minimum wage laws specifically identify the
groups of individuals to whom the laws apply. In each wave of the LFS, minimum wage
workers were therefore identified using the overlap of both the four digit SASCO occupa-
tion codes and the three digit ISIC industry codes. Any workers to whom the law did not
apply, notably the self-employed who pay their own wages, were excluded from the
analysis. We also restricted the sample to non-government employees. Estimates pre-
sented are weighted5 estimates.3.2. Sample selection and key variables
The South African Department of Labour has introduced minimum wage laws in 11 sec-
tors6. These minima are regularly updated for inflation using a formal gazetting process7.
However, it is only possible to identify nine of these sectors using the LFS data8. The fol-
lowing five sectors were included in the analysis: Retail, Domestic workers, Forestry, Taxi
workers, and Private Security. For the Contract Cleaning (introduced in 1999) and the
Hospitality sectors (introduced in 2007) no dataset for the pre- and post-law periods was
available, respectively9. The Civil Engineering sector was not included since the use of the
four-digit occupational codes in the LFS yielded a very small number of Civil Engineers for
the datasets in the pre-law period (the September 2000 and February 2001 datasets, which
are the only datasets for the period prior to the introduction of the law in March 2001, yield
only 12 and 11 observations respectively)10. As the impact of minimum wages on the
Agricultural sector was already investigated by Bhorat, Kanbur and Stanwix (2011), we
restricted our analysis to the five sectors listed above. These sectors accounted for 17.2 per-
cent of non-agricultural employment in September 2007 (approximately 2.2 million indivi-
duals). Taken together with the Agricultural sector then, the sectors covered here accounted
for around 76 percent of the sample of minimum wage workers in the September 2007
Labour Force Survey.
In order to analyse whether the changes experienced within each sector were unique
to those workers in that sector to whom the law applied, we used a unique control
group for each of the minimum wage sectors that are the treatment groups in the
analysis. For each sector, we identified a control group consisting of workers with simi-
lar characteristics to the affected sector, and who are not expected to be affected by the
minimum wage. All control groups were restricted to low-income earning individuals
(individuals earning less than R10,000 per month), who were aged between 15 and
65 years, and who had completed no more than 12 years of schooling. Furthermore,
union members, self-employed workers, government workers and part-time workers
were excluded from the control groups, as well as workers who were affected by
another minimum wage law. Additionally, the individual characteristics of workers in
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order to construct a control group with similar characteristics to the sector.
The control group for Domestic workers was restricted to African and Coloured
females who were employed in unskilled occupations (mainly elementary workers for
whom no minimum wage is set). The control group for the Forestry sector included
only African and Coloured individuals in unskilled employment. The control group for
the Retail sector included individuals in semi-skilled occupations only. Finally, for the
Security and Taxi sectors, the same control group was used, specifically African and
Coloured males employed in similar semi-skilled occupations11. Mean characteristics of
the different treatment and control groups for the different sectors are presented in
Table 1 and are discussed in more detail in Section 4 of the paper.
For the analysis of the impact of minimum wages on employment, we used a broader
control group consisting of individuals of working age who were either employed or
seeking work (narrow labour force) and who had completed no more than 12 years of
schooling12. Workers who lose their jobs in the minimum wage affected sector may
find another job or become unemployed. This specification of a broader control group
therefore allows for individuals whom may have been rendered unemployed, or who
switched jobs between waves, to be accounted for. The control group in the employ-
ment equations for each of the five minimum wage sectors examined therefore includes
workers employed in other sectors (This includes workers employed in other minimum
wage affected sectors)13.Table 1 Mean sample characteristics of sector and control groups in the pre-law period
(March and September waves)
Minimum wage sector (Treatment group) Retail Domestic Workers Forestry Taxi Security
African 0.57* 0.90* 0.98* 0.96* 0.84
Male 0.51* 0.04 0.66* 0.97 0.89
Age 34.1* 39.6* 35.5* 34.8 33.0*
Years of schooling 10.4* 6.1* 5.3* 8.9* 10.0*
Area A/Metropolitan area 0.82 0.78 0.47* 0.79 0.86
Wage Gap 0.70 0.91 0.73 0.31 0.74
Control groups Retail Domestic Workers Forestry Taxi Security
African 0.67 0.77 0.84 0.89 0.89
Male 0.71 0 0.72 1 1
Age 36 34.2 33.4 35.7 35.7
Years of schooling 8.5 7.6 8.1 8.4 7.9
Area A/Metropolitan area 0.82 0.77 0.80 0.82 0.82
F-statistic 395.0*** 116.6*** 26.5*** 293.7*** 50.2***
Source: Data are from South African Labour Force Surveys (LFS) (September and March waves) conducted by Statistics South
Africa.
Note: Estimates are weighted means for the pooled dataset that includes both September and March waves for the
pre-law period in each sector. Sample includes non self-employed, non-government workers only aged between 15 and
65 years inclusive. All control groups were restricted to non self-employed, non-government and non-unionized workers
who were not in sectors affected by minimum wage laws. Where relevant, a test for the equality of means between the
treatment and the control group was performed. An asterisk indicates that the null hypothesis for the equality of means
of the treatment and the control group was rejected at the 5 percent level. The F-statistic uses a Hotelling’s test for the
joint equality of the means of the set of demographic variables between each respective treatment and control group in
the pre-law period. The Null hypothesis assumes the joint equality of means of all demographic variables across each
treatment/control group for each sector and is rejected at the 1% level for each treatment and control group
comparison.
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groups) to their respective control groups attempted to derive a control group com-
prised of individuals with characteristics as similar as possible to the sector, it is im-
portant to explicitly acknowledge the limitations of such an identification strategy. This
is particularly so because, as noted in the literature review above, spillover effects from
covered sectors to uncovered sectors may occur due to minimum wage affected work-
ers who are rendered unemployed finding employment in other sectors (Gindling and
Terrell 2005, 2007). Such effects are difficult to detect and measure. For example, indi-
viduals in the control groups may experience a negative effect on wages due to workers
in minimum wage affected sector losing their jobs and finding employment in other
sectors. Therefore, the estimates of the impact of minimum wage laws on employment,
wages, and hours of work respectively may be biased upwards (that is, we may overesti-
mate the impact of the legislation on the treatment sector). Therefore, as explained in
the section below, we include a second difference-in-differences specification that does
not involve using a control group. This is the preferred specification unless stated
otherwise.
Individuals in each wave of the LFS were mapped to the relevant published minima.
This was done using a detailed mapping of individuals to the respective minimum wage
sector using the four-digit occupational and the three-digit industrial coding provided
with the LFS14. Since the minimum wages are set according to area for some of the
sectors, the geographical units in the LFS (magisterial districts before 2004 and district
councils from 2005 onwards) were matched to the area types A, B, C, etc. specified by
the sectoral minima15. Hourly minima were used. Minima were then assigned to the
individuals in the LFS data to whom the sectoral laws applied. The relevant sample of
minimum wage workers was assumed to be non-governmental workers who were not
self-employed.
Workers may provide wage information in the LFS as either point estimates or in
monthly brackets. Estimates provided as brackets were converted to point estimates by
random allocation within their respective brackets using a uniform distribution. On
average, the percentage of workers covered by minimum wage laws who reported their
income in bands fluctuates between 12 and 16 percent from one wave to another16.
Monthly wages were then combined and converted into hourly wages using the average
number of weekly hours worked by an individual. To obtain real wages, wages were
deflated to constant 2000 prices using the Consumer Price Index (CPIX) provided by
Statistics South Africa.
Only working-age individuals were included in the sample, that is, individuals be-
tween 15 and 65 years of age. Any individuals who reported working more than
15 hours per day were not included in the sample of workers in the analysis. In
addition, any individuals reporting zero or missing wages are excluded from the sample.
We also selected out the top 1 percent of earners in each sector as workers earning
very high wages are not assumed to be affected by minimum wage laws. The sample
included workers in all district councils, that is, both rural and urban areas. Full-time
individuals we redefined as those who work at least 27 hours per week. The regression
analysis was limited to full-time workers only.
It is worth noting that one of the limitations of the wage data in the LFS is that no
information is provided about payment in kind. The legislation specifies that the total
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kind. For the case of Domestic workers, the legislation specifies that this may not
exceed 10 percent of the wage for accommodation provided. Since we were only able
to measure wage income paid by an employer, there is a possibility that increases in
wages observed in the post-law period may simply be a reflection of the reallocation of
non-wage benefits provided by employers in order to pay higher wages.
3.3. Estimation strategy
We apply the classic Card and Krueger model (1995) to the data. Two alternate specifi-
cations are used:
Yijkt ¼ β0 þ β1Postt þ β2Sectork þ β3Postt  Sectork þ φj þ εijkt ð1Þ
Yijkt ¼ α0 þ α1Post þ a2Gapjk þ a3Postt  Gapjk þ χ ijkt þ γ ijkt ð2Þ
In equation (1) Yikt is the outcome of interest (e.g. employment, wages, hours worked,etc.) for individual i in group k, district council j and period t. Postt. is a time dummy
measuring pre-law and post-law effects. This variable is set equal to 0 for all periods
prior to the introduction of minimum wage laws in a sector, and 1 for all periods
following the introduction of the sectoral minima. We assume that the timing of the
introduction of a law is the date that the law became effective/binding in the published
legislation17. Sectork is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is employed in the
sector affected by the minimum wage (treatment group) and 0 if the individual is in the
control group. Postt * Sectork is the difference-in-differences term capturing the average
treatment effect. This term tests for whether or not the observed changes were shared
by similar groups of workers to whom the law did not apply, confirming that the results
observed were not the result of economy-wide shocks. The coefficient β1 on the Postt
variable measures the average change in the post-law period in the outcome variable
for both the treatment and the control groups. The coefficient β2 on the Sectork
variable measures the average difference in the outcome variable Yikt between the treat-
ment and the control group in the full period. The coefficient β3 on the difference-in
differences term is the key measure in this specification, showing the change in the
measured outcome for the treatment sector in the post-law period relative to the
control group18.
It is worth noting that the specification in equation (1) includes the control and the
treatment group only. Since the control group selected has similar characteristics to
the treatment group, no individual level controls are included. The equation was esti-
mated with and without district level controls φj. Under the hypothesis of a natural
experiment where we have two similar groups and a clear distinction between treated
and non-treated, we assume that in the absence of a minimum wage law the same
general trend would be observed for both groups of workers (Employment trends in
the treatment and their respective control groups are presented in Figure 1).
Equation (1) is run only on the individuals employed in that particular sector; that is,
the treatment group. χijkt are controls for various worker characteristics such as years
of schooling, age, race and gender. Using examples in the minimum wage impact litera-
ture (Card and Krueger, 1995; Lee, 1999) we construct a relative measure of the vari-
ation across district councils in the intensity of the introduced minimum (Gapjk) based
Figure 1 Trends in employment of sector and control groups, pre and post-law periods (15 survey
waves). Source: Data are from South African Labour Force Surveys (LFS) conducted by Statistics South Africa
(15 surveys from September 2000 to September 2007). Notes: Weighted estimates shown. Sample includes
non self-employed non-government workers aged between 15 and 65 years inclusive. Fitted values are
shown for the pre- and post-law period for each treatment sector and the respective control. The break in
trend represents the timing of the introduction of the law in the sector. Fitted values are estimated using a
simple linear regression of employment on time (Employment = β0Time+ α, where α is the intercept).
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equation (2) attempts to capture the intensity of the impact of the minimum wage in a
sector kin district council j19 and is constructed as follows:
Gapjk ¼ wtmjk  wt1jk
 
=wt1jk where Gapjk≥0 ð3Þ
where wmkj
t is the original minimum wage in sector k and district council j at time t,
the first year when the minimum wage was introduced in the respective sector, and
wkj
t − 1 is the initial average wage in sector k in district council j in the year prior to the
introduction of the law. The Gapjk measure is set at 0 for districts where the average
wage in the sector is greater than the minimum introduced. We construct the Gapjk
measure using real, full-time hourly wages20. Summary statistics of this measure are
presented in Table 1.
The Gapjk variable provides a measure of the proportional increase in the initial wage
that is necessary to meet the minimum wage and provides a measure of the spatial vari-
ation in the intensity of the law’s impact. The variation in the Gapjk measure captures
the regional differences based on the reported wages of workers in the pre-law period21.
The parameter a2 measures the average difference in outcomes of workers in low pre-
law wage gap versus high pre-law wage gap district councils in the period subsequent
to the introduction of the law. The difference-in-differences parameter a3 measures the
change in Yikt attributable to the minimum wage in the post-law period in district
councils where the Gapjk measure was the largest, that is, where the intensity of the
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average in the post-law period.4. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents the five different sectoral minima included in the analysis along with
the different categories within each legislation and the year and month of introduction
of the law22. The minimum wage legislation for the Retail and Wholesale sector came
into effect in February 2003. The minimum wages for this sector are the most complex,
with several different minima specified according to occupation, hours worked and area
type. Using the LFS sector and occupation codes, it was possible to identify the follow-
ing groups of workers within the sector: Managers, clerks, shop assistants, sales assis-
tants, cashiers, drivers, security guards and fork-lift operators. Within each of these
occupational categories, different minima are specified for areas A, B, and C23, as well
as in some years by firm size and for full-time and part-time employees respectively,
resulting in over 24 different categories of minima for the workers in this sector.
The sectoral minima for Domestic workers were introduced in August 2002. Within
this legislation, there are two area types, A and B. The prescribed minima differ on the
basis of whether or not the number of hours worked is below or above 27 hours per
week (part-time and full-time employees respectively).
The sectoral minimum for the Forestry sector was introduced in March 2006. There-
fore, three waves of the LFS (September 2006, March 2007 and September 2007
respectively) are available for analysis of the post-law period for this sector. The legisla-
tion sets a fixed minimum rate of remuneration for those working in all areas within
the Forestry sector, with no locational differential.
The sectoral minima for the Taxi sector were introduced in July 2005 and apply to all
workers in the transport sector involved in the operation of informal minibus taxis.
Within this legislation a distinction is made between taxi drivers and fare collectors24.Table 2 Sectoral minima and date of introduction
Sector Occupation Areas Full-time/Part-time Firm size Date
Retail Managers A, B, and
C













N/A A and B > 27 hours per week ≤ 27 hours
per week
N/A August 2003
Forestry N/A N/A N/A N/A March 2006
Taxi workers Drivers Fare
collectors







Source: Government Gazettes available from <http://www.labour.gov.za>.
Notes: 1 Since 2006.
2 Until 2005.
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2001 and apply to all employers and employees involved in guarding or protecting fixed
property, premises, goods, persons or employees (Note that Security workers in the Retail
sector are covered by the sectoral minima for Retail sector workers). There are five differ-
ent area types specified within this sector, numbered from 1 (or type A areas) through 5
respectively.
Table 1 presents the mean sample characteristics for the sectors included in the ana-
lysis across all waves in the pre-law period, along with those of their identified control
groups. Each sector is characterized by unique sample characteristics, which made it
necessary to specify a unique control group of similar workers for each sector. Workers
covered by the sectoral minima generally possess no higher than a Matric education
(12 years of schooling). Therefore, as described earlier, during the construction of the
control groups, the sample was restricted to employees with less than 12 years of
schooling. In each of the sectors, the majority of workers are located in areas which
were classified as either type A areas or metropolitan areas (over 70 percent), with the
exception of the Forestry sector.
Relative to the other sectors examined here, workers within the Retail sector have on
average completed higher levels of education. The average worker in this sector has
completed around ten years of schooling, which is high relative to the other sectors
represented here. The Domestic worker sector is comprised almost entirely of African
and Coloured unskilled females with low levels of schooling. This sector is generally
concentrated in urban households (78 percent). Within the Forestry sector, the domin-
ant share of workers is African and male (98 percent and 66 percent respectively).
These individuals generally have low levels of schooling (around 5 years of schooling
for the average worker). Workers in the Security and Taxi sectors are most likely to be
African and male with less than 12 years of schooling. The dominant share of workers
in these two sectors were located in areas classified as A or metropolitan areas. It is
worth noting that the same control group was identified for the Taxi and the Security
sectors, namely African and Coloured males engaged in similar (semi-skilled) occupa-
tions and who possessed fewer than 12 years of schooling.
In order to shed some light on the trends in employment in the period prior to and
following the introduction of the law, Figure 1 examines the changes in employment for
the five sectors and their respective control groups during the pre-law and the post-law
periods. The descriptive evidence does not indicate a significant decline in employment in
the post-law period for most of the sectors shown. Indeed, the estimates suggest that the
Security sector experienced an increase in employment in the post-law period. The only
sector where we see a significant decline in employment is within the Taxi sector. The
remaining sectors do not indicate a statistically significant change in employment in the
post-law period. For the control groups, employment generally increased or remained
stable in the post-law period. Overall then, the early evidence presented here does not
suggest a significant negative impact on employment of minimum wage laws for the five
sectors examined.
Table 3 presents the mean characteristics of employed workers for the five sectors
and their respective control groups. The majority of workers are full-time workers for
all cohorts. Examining the changes in the share of full-time workers across time, a
significant increase is observed for the Retail, Domestic worker and Security sectors in
Table 3 Mean characteristics of employed sample (2000 to 2007), treatment and control
groups








Retail Fulltime 0.92 0.94 0.95* 0.94* 0.96* 0.96* 0.96* 0.96* 0.94 0.96 0.02*
Hours per
Week




10.8 10.4 11.1 12.6 13.9* 14.0* 15.1* 15.6* 10.8 14.3 3.5*
Real hourly
wage
10.7 9.9 9.6 10.0 10.9 10.7 11.0 10.6 9.9 10.7 0.8*
Control Fulltime 0.92 0.95* 0.94* 0.96* 0.97* 0.96* 0.96* 0.97* 0.94 0.97 0.03*
Hours per
Week




9.5 9.8 10.6* 12.0* 12.4* 12.0* 13.1* 14.4* 10.0 12.8 2.8*
Real hourly
wage
9.3 9.3 9.1 9.6 9.7 9.2 9.6 9.8 9.2 9.6 0.4
Domestic
work
Fulltime 0.81 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.81 −0.02*
Hours per
Week




2.8 2.9 2.7 3.3* 4.0* 4.0* 4.8* 5.5* 2.8 4.2 1.4*
Real hourly
wage
2.7 2.7 2.3 2.6 3.1* 3.1* 3.5* 3.7* 2.7 3.1 0.4
Control Fulltime 0.87 0.95* 0.93 0.87 0.93 0.88 0.92 0.89 0.92 0.90 −0.02
Hours per
Week




4.69 5.04 5.29 5.20 5.37 5.98* 6.70* 7.40* 5.0 6.1 1.1*
Real hourly
wage
4.61 4.79 4.53 4.13 4.21 4.58 4.90 5.03 4.7 4.6 −0.1
Forestry Fulltime 0.98 0.97 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0
Hours per
Week




2.9 2.9 2.8 3.4 3.3 5.0* 4.8* 4.7* 3.5 4.5 1.0*
Real hourly
wage
2.8 2.8 2.4 2.7 2.6 3.8 3.6 3.2 2.9 3.1 0.2
Control Fulltime 0.91 0.95* 0.94 0.89 0.91 0.88 0.89 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.01
Hours per
Week




5.5 5.6 5.9 5.5 5.8 6.3 7.5* 7.9* 6.0 7.9 1.9*
Real hourly
wage
5.5 5.3 5.1 4.4 4.6 4.9 5.5 5.4 4.9 5.5 0.6*
Security Fulltime 0.96 0.98 0.99* 1.00* 0.99 0.98 0.99* 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.01
Hours per
Week
60.2 58.5 59.4 55.3 55.0 57.6 57.3 57.5 59.0 57.0 −2.0*
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6.4 6.8 7.0 7.9* 7.9* 8.2* 8.7* 9.4* 6.7 8.3 1.6*
Real hourly
wage
6.3 6.4 6.0 6.3 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.3 −0.1
Control Fulltime 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.02
Hours per
Week




9.3 8.3 11.5 9.8 10.9 11.5 12.2* 12.0* 8.6 11.3 2.7*
Real hourly
wage
9.1 7.9 9.9 7.8 8.5 8.8 8.9 8.2 8.3 8.7 0.4
Taxi Fulltime 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.99* 0.95 0.98 0.96 1.00* 0.97 0.98 0.01
Hours per
Week




4.8 4.4 4.4 4.7 5.5 4.7 5.3 5.0 4.7 5.1 0.4
Real hourly
wage
4.7 4.2 3.8 3.7* 4.3 3.6* 3.9 3.5* 4.0 3.7 −0.3
Control Fulltime 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.99* 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.99* 0.98 0.99 0.01
Hours per
Week




9.3 8.3 11.5 9.8 10.9 11.5 12.2* 12.0* 10.2 12.0 1.8*
Real hourly
wage
9.1 7.9 9.9 7.8 8.5 8.8 8.9 8.2 8.6 8.6 0
Source: Data are from South African Labour Force Surveys (LFS) conducted by Statistics South Africa (September 2000 to
2007). Both September and March waves of the survey are represented in the table.
Notes: The last column shows the difference in means between the pre and the post-law periods respectively. An
asterisk indicates a significant difference with base year (2000) at 5 percent or a significant difference in means between
the pre-law and post-law period respectively. All statistics are self-reported by workers and statistics are weighted.
Sample includes non self-employed workers aged between 15 and 65 years inclusive. The wage variables are means for
full-time workers. A fulltime worker is someone who reported at least 27 hours of work per week. The sample of covered
workers includes non-government employment only. The red line indicates the timing of the introduction of the law in
the respective sector.
Bhorat et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development 2013, 2:1 Page 12 of 27
http://www.izajold.com/content/2/1/1the post-law period. All sectors and control groups experienced a significant increase
in nominal hourly wages in the 2000–2007 period, with the exception of the Taxi
sector. The changes in real wages were mainly not statistically significant. It may be
argued that the nominal wage results may be confounded by inflation. Hence, the
remainder of the discussion focuses on real wage impacts only25. In examining the
number of usual weekly hours worked however, we find a significant decline in weekly
hours for the Retail, Domestic, and Security sectors. The control groups do not indicate
any significant changes over the period in the number of hours worked, with the excep-
tion of the control group for the Forestry sector (unskilled workers), which yields a
slight decline in usual weekly hours.
In order to examine the distribution of wages at or around the minimum and the
changes in the distribution of wages across time, Figure 2 presents non-parametric ker-
nel density plots of real hourly wages (logged) for the five sectors and their respective
control groups. The vertical line indicates the natural logarithm of the real hourly
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http://www.izajold.com/content/2/1/1minimum (2000 prices) in the first year of introduction. A spike in the wage distribu-
tion at the minimum wage indicates that the law is binding. The kernel density plots
do not reveal significant spikes at or around the minima for the five sectors examined,
with a significant proportion of workers earning below the stipulated minimum. This
result seems surprising, given that the presence of a spike is a common result in much
of the literature, notably the US as well as some Latin American countries (DiNardo,
Fortin and Lemieux, 1996; Maloney and Nuñez, 2004). This finding is analytically inter-
esting and suggests that there may be significant noncompliance with minimum wages
in these sectors26. Indeed, evidence from South Africa suggests that there may be viola-
tion of minimum wage laws. The issues of noncompliance with minimum wage laws in
South Africa and the measurement and determinants of noncompliance are discussed
in more detail in Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet (2012a, b, and c). Using both an absolute
and relative measure of noncompliance, they estimate that nearly 45 percent of employ-
ees affected by minimum wages in South Africa earned wages below their legislated
minim in 2007, with the average shortfall of wages from the relevant minimum of those
who were underpaid estimated at 35 percent.
Table 4 presents estimates of the share of workers in each of the examined sectors
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Figure 2 (See legend on next page.)
(See figure on previous page.)
Figure 2 Kernel density estimation of log of real hourly wages (2000 prices), treatment and control
groups. Source: Data are from South African Labour Force Surveys (LFS) conducted by Statistics South Africa
(September 2000 to September 2007. Notes: The bandwidth used in the Kernel density plots in Stata was
reduced from the default bandwidth to 0.02. The vertical line represents log of the first real hourly
minimum introduced in the sector (2000 prices). Wages shown are for fulltime workers, that is, those
individuals who work at least 27 hours per week. Estimates used are self-reported by workers and are for
the weighted sample. Sample includes non self-employed workers aged between 15 and 65 years inclusive.
The sample includes non-government employment only. The vertical line indicates the timing of the law in
the respective sector. Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the null hypothesis of the equality of
distributions at the 1, 5 or 10 percent level is rejected for each pair-wise comparison of the before and after
periods, with the exception of within the Taxi sector. For the control groups, we reject the null hypothesis
of the equality of distributions for all groups, with the exception of the control group for the Security
sector.
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sectors examined, with the share of workers estimated to be earning below the minimum
reaching 82% in the Domestic worker sector in the first year of introduction on the mini-
mum wage. In order to examine wages near the minimum, estimates of the share of work-
ers whose wages were below but within 10 percent of the real hourly minimum wage are
also included27. The estimates suggest that the fraction of workers in the nearly compliant
region of the wage distribution may have increased for certain sectors since the introduc-
tion of the minimum (notably Retail and Domestic work). The results suggest that a frac-
tion of employers may be partially complying with minimum wage laws and paying wages
a certain fraction below the minimum. However, it is crucial to note that the share of
workers with wages in the ‘near compliant’ region of the minimum wage are far out-
weighed by those receiving wages that are non-compliant outside of this region. WhatTable 4 Fraction of workers below the minimum by sector and year (post-law period)
Fraction < minimum Retail Domestic work Forestry Taxi Security
2002 0.82 0.53
2003 0.50 0.75* 0.49
2004 0.50 0.72* 0.49
2005 0.50 0.74* 0.56 0.48
2006 0.38* 0.75* 0.56 0.48 0.49
2007 0.40* 0.71* 0.60 0.64 0.51
Fraction 10% below minimum Retail Domestic work Forestry Taxi Security
2002 0.06 0.10
2003 0.03 0.06 0.07
2004 0.04 0.08 0.06
2005 0.05 0.09* 0.06 0.08
2006 0.05 0.09* 0.06 0.12 0.08
2007 0.07* 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.11
Source: Data are from South African Labour Force Surveys (LFS) conducted by Statistics South Africa (September 2000 to
2007). Both September and March waves of the survey are represented in the table.
Notes: The minimum wage is the real hourly minimum (2000 prices). Wages used in the calculations are real hourly
wages of fulltime workers. An asterisk indicates a significant difference with the first year of introduction of the minimum
wage in the respective sector at 5 percent. All statistics are self-reported by workers and estimated are weighted. Sample
includes non self-employed workers aged between 15 and 65 years inclusive. Only estimates for fulltime workers are
shown. A fulltime worker is someone who reported at least 27 hours of work per week. The sample of minimum wage
affected workers includes non-government employment only.
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compliance with the law across all minimum wage schedules.
As the results above suggest, although compliance with minimum wage laws may be
imperfect, shifts in the wage distribution may still occur as employers may be partially com-
plying with the minimum wage laws. In this paper, we therefore examine shifts in the overall
distribution in order to determine whether the laws had an impact on the respective sectors.
Examining the shifts in the distribution between the pre-law and the post-law periods then,
the results suggest that there is some evidence of a rightward shift in the post-law wage
distributions for most of the sectors examined. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests performed to test
for distributional differences between the pre-law and the post-law periods indicate that the
post-law distribution is significantly different from that of the pre-law period for the Retail,
Domestic, Forestry, and Security sectors. An exception is the Taxi sector, for which the Null
hypothesis of the equality of distributions is not rejected at the 10 percent level.
Finally, Figure 3 examines the distribution of hours worked per week in the pre- and
post-law periods. The plots indicate that the distribution shifted leftwards for most of
the sectors in the period after the introduction of the law. We reject the Null hypoth-
esis for the equality of distributions using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the Retail,
Domestic, Forestry and Security sectors at the 10 percent level. This suggests a signifi-
cant downward shift in hours worked in four out of the five sectors examined in the
post-law period.
Overall then, the descriptive results suggest that whilst a significant decline in em-
ployment is not observed for most sectors in the post-law period, there is some indica-
tion that minimum wage sectors experienced an increase in wages and a reduction in
hours worked after the law was introduced. We now turn to an econometric analysis of
the impact of the sectoral minimum wage laws below.5. Econometric results
As outlined above, two alternative specifications of a difference-in-differences model
are used in order to investigate the effects of the introduction of minimum wage laws
on the applicable sectors. The effects of the legislated minima are investigated on
employment, wage levels and hours of work. An analysis of the results may be used to
indicate whether the changes observed within a sector were unique to the specific
group of workers, as well as whether the impact of the law was larger in district coun-
cils where pre-law wages were lower relative to the introduced minima. The results
from the difference-in-differences analysis are presented in Tables 4 through 6.
Table 5 shows the results from the difference-in-differences estimation of the impact
of the sectoral minima on the probability of employment. For each of the five sectors
examined, the first specification shown estimates the employment equation with indi-
vidual level controls, specifically age, education, gender and race. The second specifica-
tion includes both individual level controls as well as controls for district councils. The
dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual is employed in the
respective sector covered by the minimum wage law, and equal to 0 otherwise28. As
stated earlier, the sample in the equations for employment includes all employed indivi-
duals and demographically similar unemployed working age individuals who are search-
ing for work. Therefore the sample in each wave in the employment equations for each








0 50 100 150 0 50 100 150

























0 50 100 150 0 50 100 150
Taxi Taxi control





0 50 100 150 0 50 100 150
Security Security control
Figure 3 Kernel density estimation of usual hours worked per week, treatment and control groups.
Source: Data are from South African Labour Force Surveys (LFS) conducted by Statistics South Africa (September
2000 to September 2007). Notes: Figures include both full-time and part-time workers. Usual hours worked
per week are self-reported by workers and estimates shown are for the weighted sample. Sample includes
non self-employed workers aged between 15 and 65 years inclusive. The sample includes non-government
employment only. The vertical line is drawn at 45 hours per week. Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the
null hypothesis of the equality of distributions at the 1 or 5 percent level is rejected for each pair-wise
comparison of the before and after periods for the Retail, Domestic, Forestry and Security sectors only. The
null hypothesis of the equality of distributions is also rejected for the control groups at the 1 percent level.
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individuals who are employed in other sectors (this includes other minimum wage
affected sectors29), and those individuals who are unemployed but searching for work
(narrow unemployed).
Contrary to the results predicted under a standard competitive model however, the
results presented here for the employment equations do not yield a significant negative
effect of the minimum wage on employment for the sectors analysed. The coefficient
on the Postt variable for the Retail, Domestic, and Security sectors is positive and
significant, suggesting that the probability of employment in these sectors was higher
in the post-law period. The results show no significant change in the probability of em-
ployment for the Forestry sector in the period after the introduction of the law in 2006.
Table 5 Probability of employment by sector (Dependent variable = Pr (Employment))
Sector Retail Domestic Forestry Taxi Security
I II I II I II I II I II
Post 0.0038** 0.0038** 0.0066*** 0.0061*** −0.0005 0.0003 −0.0030*** −0.0030*** 0.0039*** 0.0026**
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0011)
Wage gap −0.0001 −0.0126*** 0.0058** −0.00001 −0.0034*
(0.0018) (0.0045) (0.0026) (0.0001) (0.0017)
Wage gap*Post −0.0002 −0.0003 −0.0005 −0.0004 −0.0001 −0.0004 0.00005 0.00004 0.0001 0.0002
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.00005) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Individual controls included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls included No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant 0.0231*** 0.0327*** 0.0192** −0.0003 0.0006 0.0222*** 0.0059*** 0.0033*** 0.0293*** −0.0047
(0.0064) (0.0062) (0.0086) (0.0066) (0.0011) (0.0057) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0032) (0.0036)
Observations 493,809 493,809 493,809 493,809 267,108 267,108 455,266 455,266 464,046 464,046
Number of districts 52 52 52 52 30 30 45 45 46 46
R-squared 0.0130 0.0150 0.0970 0.1040 0.0040 0.0180 0.0040 0.0050 0.0100 0.0160
F-statistic 193.75*** 162.68*** 124*** 167.85*** 2.51** 2.41* 26.36*** 51.9*** 43.76*** 52.59***
Source: Data are from South African Labour Force Surveys (LFS) conducted by Statistics South Africa (15 waves September 2000 to September 2007).
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is employed in the respective sector and equal to 0 otherwise. The sample includes individuals of working age who are employed or seeking
work, and who have completed no more than 12 years of schooling (Matric). Robust standard errors clustered by district council are shown in parentheses.***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Individual controls include
controls for race, years of schooling and gender. The wage gap measures the proportional increase in the real wages of workers in district council i at time t-1 necessary to meet the minimum wage at time t. The
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http://www.izajold.com/content/2/1/1Only the Taxi sector yields a negative and significant coefficient for the Postt variable,
suggesting that the probability of employment in that sector dropped slightly in the
period following the introduction of the law.
The coefficients for the Gapjk variable in Specification (1) were negative and signifi-
cant at the 1 and 10 percent level for the Domestic worker and Security sectors
respectively. The negative results are suggestive of a reduced probability of employment
in those sectors in district councils where the pre-law wages were farther below the
introduced minima. For the Forestry sector, this result is positive, indicating a higher
probability of employment in the Forestry sector in district councils where wages were
the lowest relative to the minima. This result may be explained by the low wages in the
Forestry sector relative to other sectors, and may simply be capturing districts with
more Forestry workers and therefore lower wages. The Retail and the Taxi sectors yield
an insignificant result for the pre-law wage gap variable. The interaction effect between
the Gapjk variable and the Postt variable included in both specifications measures the
effect of the law in the post-law period in district councils where the minimum wage
was most binding. However, this variable does not yield a significant result in any of
the equations. Overall, we conclude then that the evidence here does not indicate a
significant effect of the introduction of minimum wages in the respective sectors at the
extensive margin.
The second outcome examined here is wage levels. The descriptive evidence pre-
sented above indicates that all minimum wage sectors experienced a significant in-
crease in nominal wages in the post-law period. Whilst real wages also increased in
some of the sectors, the increase in real wages is less evident than the increase in nom-
inal wages. Furthermore, the observed increase in wages in the respective minimum
wage sectors may have been due to factors external to the introduction of the sectoral
laws. A difference-in-differences approach as outlined above is therefore used to firstly,
test whether or not the introduced minima had an effect on the wages of covered work-
ers relative to a similar group of workers who were not affected by the law, and sec-
ondly, to measure the differential effect of the introduced minima in areas where the
pre-law wages of the respective sector were further below the minima. The effects of
the minima on real wages are investigated, and the results are shown in Table 630. The
dependent variable was the log of real wages in 2000 prices. All specifications include
controls for individual characteristics, that is, age, gender, education and race. For each
of the sectors, the sample in the first specification includes workers employed in the
relevant sector who are covered by the minimum wage, and workers in a control group.
The results from this specification compare the wages of workers in the specific sector
against wages of individuals in the control group. The second and third specifications
include only workers in the relevant minimum wage sector, and measure whether
wages increased more in areas where the pre-law wage gap was the largest. Whilst
Specification (II) does not include controls for district councils, Specification (III) pro-
vides a test of robustness of the results in Specification (II) by including district council
level controls. Specification (III) is therefore considered as the preferred estimation in
the analysis. As mentioned above, whilst the district-council specific Gapjk measure is
dropped in the third specification, the key difference-in-difference indicator, notably
the Postt * Gapjk measure, remains identified and may be used to determine the impact
of the law on the outcome variable.
Table 6 Log of real hourly wages, difference-in-differences (Dependent variable = log real hourly wage in 2000 prices)
Retail Domestics Forestry Taxi Security
I II III I II III I II III I II III I II III
Post 0.0517** −0.0041 −0.0066 0.0641 0.0727*** 0.0547** 0.128*** 0.195** 0.195** 0.0289 −0.0662 −0.0021 0.0403 −0.0690 −0.0671
(0.0198) (0.0194) (0.0192) (0.0431) (0.0230) (0.0239) (0.0189) (0.0905) (0.0869) (0.0314) (0.0562) (0.0398) (0.0344) (0.0479) (0.0435)
Sector −0.0622*** −0.394*** −0.209*** −0.646*** −0.380***
(0.0217) (0.0451) (0.0773) (0.0413) (0.0386)
Sector*Post −0.0122 0.0554 0.0325 −0.00936 −0.0246
(0.0234) (0.0437) (0.0740) (0.0512) (0.0524)
Wage gap −0.286*** −0.536*** 0.0055 −0.0250*** −0.387***
(0.0563) (0.0341) (0.0567) (0.0088) (0.108)
Wage gap*Post 0.0651*** 0.0568** 0.0552** 0.0698*** −0.0113 −0.0079 0.0190*** 0.0152*** 0.232*** 0.272***
(0.0216) (0.0213) (0.0249) (0.0254) (0.0378) (0.0334) (0.0045) (0.0033) (0.0802) (0.0635)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Constant 0.978*** 0.687*** 0.636*** 0.630*** 0.810*** 0.234*** 0.778*** 0.622*** 0.411** 1.317*** 1.083*** 0.995*** 1.380*** 1.198*** 1.137***
(0.0495) (0.0865) (0.0521) (0.0830) (0.0895) (0.0693) (0.0593) (0.163) (0.162) (0.0661) (0.170) (0.107) (0.0716) (0.125) (0.0950)
Observations 64,974 18,986 18,986 30,601 25,874 25,874 15,202 1,840 1,840 4,630 1,659 1,659 9,451 6,281 6,281
Number of districts 53 52 52 53 52 52 53 29 29 53 45 45 53 46 46
R-squared 0.383 0.368 0.419 0.333 0.274 0.318 0.309 0.103 0.231 0.393 0.040 0.20 0.251 0.138 0.204
F-statistic 476.49*** 187.06*** 302.46*** 64.62*** 208.25*** 44.39*** 90.37*** 63.02*** 154.70*** 136.74*** 7.45*** 9.54*** 179.39*** 37.26*** 85.91***
Source: Data are from South African Labour Force Surveys (LFS) conducted by Statistics South Africa (15 waves September 2000 to September 2007).
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the real hourly wage for full-time workers (those individuals who report working a minimum of 27 hours per week). Sample includes non self-employed workers aged
between 15 and 65 years inclusive. The sample includes non-government employment only. In the first specification the sample includes the treatment and the control group only, whilst in the second specification,
the sample is restricted to the sector of interest only. Robust standard errors clustered by district council are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Individual controls include controls for race, years of
schooling and gender. The wage gap measures the proportional increase in the real wages of workers in district council i at time t-1 necessary to meet the minimum wage at time t. The F-statistic refers to the test for
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http://www.izajold.com/content/2/1/1Considering the results for real wages (Table 6), our difference-in-differences esti-
mates from Specification (I) suggest that in two of the five minimum wage schedules
examined, namely Retail and Forestry, average real wages in the post-law period rose
significantly relative to the relevant control group (approximately between 5 and 13
percent in Retail and Forestry respectively). For the remaining three sectors, no signifi-
cant change occurred. The coefficients on the sector dummy variables for all five sec-
tors are negative and statistically significant, indicating that individuals in these sectors
earned significantly lower wages in real terms than their control groups in the overall
period. This result is as expected, given that minimum wage laws were introduced in
sectors where wages were generally considered to be low. The difference-in-difference
estimator, notably the Postt * Sectork variable, yields an insignificant coefficient for all
five sectors. The results from Specification (I) therefore do not suggest a positive
impact of the law on real wages of workers in the five sectors examined in the post-law
period relative to their control groups.
However, as noted above, spillover effects may exist when using control group com-
parisons. Therefore, Specifications (II) and (III) are estimated on only those individuals
employed in the respective sector and may be considered as the preferred set of results.
Specification (II) tests whether wages increased more in district councils where the
pre-law wage gap was larger31. The significant and positive coefficient on the Postt vari-
able indicates that in the post-law period real wages rose on average in two of the five
sectors, namely Domestic work, and Forestry. The negative and significant result on
the pre-law wage gap variable for the Retail, Domestic, Taxi and Security sectors indi-
cates that in district councils where the pre-law wage gap was larger, hourly wages were
lower. This result is as expected, given that district councils with larger wage gaps are
reflective of a larger number of workers with lower wages. The difference-in-difference
estimator, the Postt * Gapjk variable, yields a significant and positive coefficient in all
sectors examined, barring the Forestry sector. This result suggests that workers in these
sectors who were located in district councils where the wage gap was larger experi-
enced a larger increase in their earnings during the post-law period compared to their
counterparts located in district councils with a lower pre-law wage gap. Specification
(III) tests the robustness of these results to the inclusion of district council level con-
trols. The positive and significant coefficient for the Postt * Gapjk variable for the Retail,
Domestic, Taxi and Security worker sectors suggests that district councils with larger
wage gaps were associated with larger increases in real earnings during the post-law
period. Collectively then, the results here suggest that the introduction of minimum
wage laws were associated with positive increases in real hourly earnings in the post-
law period in four of the five sectors examined.
The impact of minimum wage laws on the number of usual hours worked per week
is now considered. Employers may reduce the number of hours worked in order to pay
the higher wages specified by the minimum wage schedules, or to comply with the
maximum number of weekly hours set out by the respective sectoral law. Hamermesh
(1993) argues that employers may be quicker to adjust the number of hours worked by
employees than to adjust employment. Table 7 presents the results from the difference-
in-differences analysis on the changes in the number of usual hours worked per week,
for each of the five sectors between 2000 and 2007. The significant and positive results
for the sectoral dummies in the first specification for Retail, Taxi and Security workers
Table 7 Usual hours worked per week, difference-in-differences (Dependent variable: Number of usual weekly hours)
Retail Domestics Forestry Taxi Security
I II III I II III I II III I II III I II III
Post −0.315** −1.444*** −1.346*** −1.016 −1.255 −1.063 −1.382*** −1.285 −1.048 0.474 0.619 0.656 −1.347*** −2.174*** −2.339***
(0.137) (0.357) (0.357) (0.607) (0.861) (0.826) (0.299) (1.360) (1.497) (0.849) (2.585) (2.848) (0.476) (0.677) (0.635)
Sector 3.163*** −1.272 0.516 20.17*** 11.75***
(0.304) (0.840) (0.701) (0.729) (0.753)
Sector*Post −1.203*** −0.352 0.0757 −0.789 −1.741**
(0.232) (0.724) (1.080) (2.416) (0.755)
Wage gap 2.719*** 3.186** −0.394** 0.331*** 3.622*
(0.586) (1.333) (0.166) (0.0729) (2.121)
Wage gap*Post −0.128 −0.108 −0.0221 −0.319 −1.153 −1.251 −0.772*** −0.751*** −2.561 −2.706
(0.350) (0.351) (0.632) (0.605) (0.781) (0.845) (0.215) (0.227) (1.971) (1.767)
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Constant 49.13*** 52.63*** 54.28*** 51.01*** 44.02*** 49.72*** 49.67*** 50.82*** 55.39*** 45.76*** 58.20*** 56.58*** 49.59*** 60.95*** 61.95***
(0.405) (1.042) (0.719) (1.140) (1.119) (0.962) (1.238) (1.865) (3.434) (1.790) (3.034) (3.125) (2.056) (2.447) (2.440)
Observations 64,974 18,986 18,986 30,601 25,874 25,874 15,202 1,840 1,840 4,630 1,659 1,659 9,451 6,281 6,281
Number of districts 53 52 52 53 52 52 53 29 29 53 45 45 53 46 46
R-squared 0.082 0.089 0.113 0.093 0.048 0.106 0.052 0.015 0.048 0.387 0.015 0.076 0.152 0.023 0.057
F-statistic 117.91*** 58.48*** 42.99*** 23.84*** 11.8*** 12.92*** 8.71*** 5.89*** 3.26** 149.10*** 37.35*** 27.10*** 130.04*** 24.97*** 23.40***
Source: Data are from South African Labour Force Surveys (LFS) conducted by Statistics South Africa (15 waves September 2000 to September 2007).
Notes: The dependent variable is the usual number of hours worked per week as reported for full-time workers (those individuals who report working a minimum of 27 hours per week). Sample includes non self-
employed workers aged between 15 and 65 years inclusive. The sample includes non-government employment only. In the first specification the sample includes the treatment and the control group only, whilst in the
second specification, the sample is restricted to the sector of interest only. Robust standard errors clustered by district council are shown in parentheses.***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,*p < 0.1. Individual controls include controls
for race, years of schooling and gender. The wage gap measures the proportional increase in the real wages of workers in district council i at time t-1 necessary to meet the minimum wage at time t. The F-statistic
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in the respective control groups in the overall period. The results for the estimated
coefficients for the difference-in-difference term (Postt * Sectork) suggest that in the
Retail and Security sectors employers adjusted significantly at the intensive margin to
accommodate the increase in the wage bill. The coefficient for the difference-in-
difference estimator is negative and significant for both these sectors, suggesting that
there was a significant decline in the number of hours worked in the post-law period
relative to the relevant control group. Specifications (II) and (III) also yield a significant
decline in average weekly hours during the post-law period for the Retail and Security
sectors. However, the difference-in-differences parameter on the Postt * Gapjk variable
was not significant for these sectors, suggesting that the effect on hours worked across
district councils did not vary depending on the intensity of the minimum introduced.
The second and third specifications do however yield a significant and negative coeffi-
cient for the difference-in-difference estimator for the Taxi sector, suggesting a negative
adjustment at the intensive margin due to the introduction of the law for this sector.
Overall however, the results do indicate that whilst the estimates for employment do
not yield significant adjustments, there is some evidence that employers may have
adjusted at the intensive margin in certain sectors.
Collectively then, the above suggests that real hourly wages increased in most of the
minimum wage covered sectors analysed, with larger increases occurring in district
councils where workers were further below the introduced minimum. For some sectors,
there is also evidence of a downward intensive margin adjustment in the post-law
period. Due to the adjustment in both real hourly wages and hours of work for some of
the sectors, it is unclear whether or not workers in those sectors were better off in real
income terms following the enactment of the legislation. Therefore, we attempted to
explore the implications of the above results by using real monthly earnings instead as
an outcome variable in a difference-in-differences analysis32. The results showed that
workers in three of the five sectors, namely Retail, Domestic Work, and Security, were
better off in terms of real monthly wages following the introduction of the law. For the
Retail and Security sectors, the results from the difference-in-differences analysis indi-
cated that the rise in real hourly wages was sufficient to offset the adjustment observed
at the intensive margin in these sectors. Consequently, there was a significant increase
in monthly earnings following the introduction of the law. In the Domestic worker
sector, whilst real monthly wages increased significantly during the post-law period,
there was so significant impact of the law at the intensive margin. As a result, workers
in this sector were better off in terms of real monthly wages following the introduction
of the law. Meanwhile, in the Forestry and the Taxi sectors, the results suggest that real
hourly wage increases were offset by intensive margin adjustments, yielding overall an
insignificant effect on total monthly wages in the post-law period. The Forestry sector
yielded an insignificant impact of the law on real hourly wages and hours of work, and
therefore workers were no better or worse off after the legislation in real income terms.
On the other hand, in the Taxi sector, the results imply that increases in real hourly
wages were offset by negative adjustments at the intensive margin, yielding an overall
insignificant effect of the law on real monthly wages. The interaction between an ad-
justment in hours of work and the real wage earned following the advent of the mini-
mum wage is therefore crucial. These results suggest that intensive margin adjustments
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actually make workers better off.6. Conclusion
The standard competitive model predicts that firms will reduce employment in response
to the minimum wage, in turn causing a negative employment effect to be observed.
However, our analysis above of the effect of the introduction of a minimum wage in a
low-wage sector shows no clear evidence that the introduction of minimum wage laws
had a significant impact on employment in a given period for the five sectors analysed.
Although the results here appear to be at odds with the standard prediction from many
earlier studies that found a negative employment impact of minimum wages (Brown et al.
1982; Charles et al. 1983), they are consistent with some of the more recent international
studies on minimum wages that do not always find a negative employment effect asso-
ciated with the minimum wage (Katz and Krueger 1992; Card and Krueger, 1995).
We also find some evidence of a significant increase in real hourly wages in the post-
law period as a result of the introduction of a minimum wage, and that wages increased
more in district councils where pre-law wages were further below the introduced mini-
mum in four of the five sectors examined (Retail, Domestic work, Taxi and Security).
The results for the Domestic worker sector are consistent with other South African
studies on the impact of minimum wages in this sector, that show that whilst minimum
wage laws were not found to have a significant impact on employment, they were asso-
ciated with a significant increase in wages within the sector (Dinkelman and Ranchhod,
2012; Hertz, 2005).
Whilst there is no strong evidence for negative employment adjustments at the
extensive margin of labour demand, the results do suggest that the sectoral minima did
have some effect at the intensive margin. There is some indication that for sectors
where employment continued to rise in the post-law period, notably the Retail and
Security sectors, the introduction of minimum wages may have been associated with a
reduction in the usual number of weekly hours worked. This result may be indicative
of employers adjusting at the intensive margin in order to pay higher wages. Three of
the five sectors (Retail, Domestic and Security) showed an increase in real hourly wages
that was sufficient to outweigh any adjustments at the intensive margin, resulting in
workers in these sectors experiencing an improvement in their real monthly income as
a consequence of the enactment of the law. For the remaining two sectors (Forestry
and Taxi) the evidence suggests that workers in these sectors may not have been any
better or worse off in real income terms in the period following the introduction of the
legislation.
Ultimately then, through the use of a fairly standard set of econometric techniques,
this study has provided an exhaustive set of estimates on the employment, wage and
hours of work responses to multiple sectoral minimum wage schedules in South Africa.
As an African, middle-income country these estimates are unique in and of themselves.
As part of the new minimum wage literature this paper has suggested that the theore-
tical wage-employment trade-off is not always readily observed in practice, and further-
more, that the medium-term labour market consequences of minimum wage policy are
far more varied and unpredictable than most theory would suggest.
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1 Minimum wages were first introduced under the Fair Labour Standards Act (1938).
2 New Zealand was the first country to introduce minimum wage legislation in 1894
(Starr 1981); Minimum wages first came into effect in the United Sates as part of the
Fair Labour Standards Act in 1938.
3 Gindling and Terrell (2005, 2007) note that a search of articles published on mini-
mum wages using popular search engines reveals that for the 1985–2000 period, only
22 studies were on countries other than the U.S, compared with 120 using U.S. data.
4 Department of Labour (1999) Government Notice No. 622. Sectoral Determination
1: Contract Cleaning Sector, South Africa. Available from:<http://www.labour.gov.za/le-
gislation/sectoral-determinations/sectoral-determination-1-contract-cleaning-sector>.
5 In terms of the construction of our weights, the earlier LFS surveys up to 2002 are
benchmarked to the 1996 Census, whereas the later surveys for the post-2002 period
are benchmarked to the 2001 Census. Therefore, the use of the LFS weights in analys-
ing cross-sectional data across time raises concerns around the consistency of results
(Hertz, 2005; Hertz, 2006). discusses how the inconsistencies arising from the weights
used can affect any analysis of the impact of minimum wage laws. We use a set of indi-
vidual weights developed by Branson (2009) on the basis of entropy estimation, which
we believe to be more reliable than the StatsSA weights. The weights are available from
Data First at the University of Cape Town (See <http://www.datafirst.uct.ac.za>).
6 Bhorat et. al. (2012b) provide a detailed description of minimum wage institutions
in South Africa.
7 The minima are regularly updated for inflation and using increases of different per-
centages. For example, in the Retail sector, the minima are updated as follows: Current
annual minimum = Previous year’s minimum wage + CPIX + 1%.
8 Of the remaining sectors affected by minimum wage laws, two are not identifiable using
the Labour Force Survey data; namely Learnerships, and Children in the Performance of
Advertising, Artistic and Cultural Activities. Employment information in the Labour Force
Survey is only provided for individuals in the working age population, that is, individuals
aged between 15 and 65 years.
9 The earliest dataset available is the September 2000 Labour Force Survey, whilst the
September 2007 Labour Force Survey remains the most recent dataset with useable
wage data in South Africa.
10 This created a problem particularly when generating the Wage Gap variable that is
used in the model, which is constructed as the gap between the minimum and the
mean wage in the pre-law in a district. Due to the small number of Civil Engineers we
are able to identify in the dataset, there are some districts where no Civil Engineers are
found and a Wage gap cannot be specified for these districts.
11 These included types of machine and plant operators who were not affected by any
minimum wage laws.
12 Bhorat, Stanwix, and Kanbur (2011) use a similar control group in order to investi-
gate the impact of the minimum wage on employment in a specific sector. Another
application, albeit not a difference-in-difference model, is found in Gindling and Terrell
(2005, 2007).
13 As explained further below in the discussion of the econometric results, we
explored excluding workers employed in other minimum wage affected sectors in each
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sider to be the more complete specification of the control group that is, including indi-
viduals who may have switched jobs between sectors between survey waves.
14 The Labour Force Survey provides four-digit occupational codes based on the
South African Classification of Occupations (SASCO) and three-digit industrial codes
(International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities).
15 This mapping was previously done in Bhorat et al. (2012b) for the 2007 LFS.
Magisterial districts, which are smaller than district councils, were mapped into district
councils. See Bhorat et al. (2012b) for a more detailed account of the methodology used
in mapping workers in the Labour Force Survey to the different area types.
16 An exception is the September 2000 LFS, which shows that only 6 percent of the
sample reported their income in bands.
17 Note that given the differences in the time of introduction of the various sectoral
minimum wage laws, the Postt variable is not uniform across sectors. Hence, the impact
of the law on each sector is assessed separately.
18 It is worth mentioning that the timing of the introduction of a minimum wage law
may differ from the timing of the announcement of the law. The implication of the
latter is that employers may have anticipated the introduction of minimum wages in a
particular sector and responded to the legislation before the law was actually imple-
mented or became binding. Anticipatory adjustments from employers would however
bias us against finding significant impacts of the minimum wage laws on the sectors
examined.
19 Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012) use a similar measure constructed at the provincial
level, whilst Hertz (2005) uses magisterial districts as the unit of analysis (Magisterial dis-
tricts are smaller geographical areas than district councils. However, the use of magisterial
districts as a unit of analysis yields very small sample sizes for some of the magisterial
districts). Another application of such a relative wage gap measure in a difference-in-
differences analysis of the impact of minimum wage legislation may be found in Lee (1999).
20 Note that for the Retail sector, the wages of Managers were excluded when con-
structing the Gapjk variable as these individuals generally earned above the minima in
the pre-law period.
21 Note that since the Gapjk measure constructed is district-specific, this specification
does not include district level effects.
22 The date that the particular law was effective/binding as per the published mini-
mum wage schedule is used as the date of introduction of the law. However, this may
not be the same as the date of announcement of the law (see earlier footnote).
23 Areas are demarcated by the Department of Labour for the purpose of setting
minima on the basis of the average household income recorded for the municipal area
on the basis of the 1996 Census. Generally, areas are categorized as follows:
A – Average income greater than R24,000 per annum; B – Average income between
R12,000 and R24,000 per annum; C – Average income less than R12,000 per annum
24 It is important to note that the Taxi sector minima do not apply to employees in
the metered taxi sector.
25 As previously noted, minimum wages are regularly updated for inflation. There-
fore, an increase in wages observed across sectors may be reflective of the periodic
increases in the legislated minima.
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http://www.izajold.com/content/2/1/126 There are a number of other possible explanations for the lack of an obvious spike
at the relevant minima for these sectors in South Africa. Firstly, the smoothing param-
eter used in the construction of the kernel density graphs may be obscuring a spike at
the minimum. In order to control for the possibility that the bandwidth is too large
and obscuring a spike, the bandwidth used in the construction of the Kernal plots was
reduced to a fraction of the software default bandwidth (The bandwidth used in the
plots presented here is the reduced bandwidth set to 0.02). Secondly, there may be an
issue surrounding the reporting of wages in brackets versus point estimates in the
Labour Force Survey. As noted above, around 12 to 16 percent of workers reported
their wages in brackets in each wave of the survey. Estimation of the kernel density
plots excluding wages that were reported in bands however, did not reveal a significant
spike.
27 This is an approach taken in Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012). They examine
wages within a certain fraction (that is, between δ1 and wm where δ1 is 90 percent of
the wm) of the minimum wage (nearly compliant region) and examine shifts from the
noncompliant region (below δ1) to the nearly compliant region as evidence of an in-
complete wage adjustment in response to the law.
28 As noted earlier, the sample in the employment analysis is all individuals of work-
ing age who are employed or searching for work, and who have no more than 12 years
of schooling. This yields just under 500,000 observations across all 15 waves for the
Retail, Domestic, Taxi, and Security sectors. For the Forestry sector, the sample is smal-
ler (around 267,000 observations) due to the smaller size of the sample for these work-
ers in the dataset.
29 The results were estimated using a control group for each sector that excluded
workers employed in other minimum wage affected sectors in each wave. However,
there was no significant change in the results, that is, the impact of the minimum wage
on employment was statistically insignificant (Results are not shown here but are avail-
able upon request).
30 As noted earlier, the nominal wage results may be confounded by inflation. There-
fore, only real wage impacts are analysed here.
31 Note that a larger pre-law wage gap denotes lower wages in the pre-law period in
the respective sector relative to the minimum introduced.
32 Monthly wages are reported in the Labour Force Survey and could therefore be
used as an outcome variable. These results are available upon request.
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